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BOOK REVIEW
WAR AND JUSTICE. By Robert L. Phillips.*
University of Oklahoma Press, 1984.

Norman:

Reviewed by CharlesJ. Reid, Jr.**

The dust jacket of Robert Phillips' book, War and Justice, juxtaposes in

the upper left corner a medieval knight mounted on horseback, axe in hand,
with a stylized intercontinental ballistic missile poised for liftoff in the lower
right corner. The illustration neatly captures the question Phillips grapples
with in his book: that is, what relevance does the "just war" theory, conceived of in nascent form by churchmen in the waning years of the Roman
Empire and brought to full flower by the lawyers and philosophers of the

twelfth through seventeenth centuries, have for policymakers today? Some
authors have taken the position that traditional just war theory has little
contemporary importance.' Just war scholarship, however, has been the focus of a considerable revival in the last several years. 2 Recently, for exam*

Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut and Director of

the Program for the Study of the Ethical Issues of Peace and War.
** Sage Graduate Fellow, Cornell University. B.A. 1978, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D. 1982, The Catholic University of America; J.C.L. 1985, The Catholic University
of America.
1. Robert Tucker, for example, has criticized just war thought in the following terms:
Now as in the past, the doctrine of bellum justum does not attempt to deal with the
critical issue of means simply by abandoning statecraft. In most of its contemporary
versions, as in its traditional versions, it seeks instead to square the circle by acknowledging that the state has its necessities and at the same time by insisting that the
measures by which these necessities may be preserved must remain limited.
R. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR: EXPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN CONCEPT 12 (1960), quoted in
R. PHILLIPS, WAR AND JUSTICE 3-4 (1984).
Phillips takes issue with Tucker's assertion and argues that, for reasons of morality and
national self-interest, just war doctrine should be adhered to as a means of keeping conflicts
limited and just. Far from being incompatible with the needs of statecraft, Phillips argues that
such modern conditions as nuclear deterrence doctrine and guerilla insurgency movements
require a restraint such as just war doctrine on the means of pursuing necessities of state.
2. Some significant books include: D. HOLLENBACH, NUCLEAR ETHICS: A CHRISTIAN
MORAL ARGUMENT (1983); M. NOVAK, MORAL CLARITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE (1983); W.
O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR]; W. O'BRIEN, NUCLEAR WAR, DETERRENCE, AND MORALITY (1967); P. RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
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pie, the American Catholic Bishops, in their pastoral letter, The Challenge of
Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,3 have sought to apply just war
teaching to the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence. Phillips fits squarely into
the latter school of thought, finding that just war teaching remains the only
moral approach to the application of armed force in foreign affairs.
Phillips' book is a work of moral philosophy; it is not directly concerned
with international legal questions. Nonetheless, international lawyers and
other international affairs professionals can profit from reading it. It has the
twin virtues of providing a rather conventional summary of just war thought
and of surveying a number of different issues. Yet, unlike much of the current just war literature, which seems transfixed by the horror that would
ensue from full scale nuclear war at the expense of other concerns, War and
Justice examines a wide range of issues. It covers not only nuclear deterrence, but guerrilla insurgency movements, the conduct of conventional war,
and the place of pacifism and realpolitik in the contemporary international
order. Essentially an argument in behalf of the continued validity of just
war theory, not an in-depth analysis of particular issues, the volume is somewhat weakened by its failure to examine more thoroughly some of its more
provocative and controversial statements. Even so, it is a helpful introduction to the issues and the jargon of just war analysis. Although this review
will at points be critical, this should not detract from the overall conclusion
that War and Justice is a useful contribution to the literature.
The volume begins with a brief excursus on the history of the Christian
response to the moral dilemmas of war. Phillips points out that the initial
Christian response to war was fundamentally pacifist. This response, however, was based more on a desire to be "total[ly] disengage[d] from statecraft
and from the things of this world generally," 4 than on a reasoned opposition
(1968); P. RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE: How SHALL MODERN WAR
BE CONDUCTED JUSTLY? (1961); R. SPAETH, No EASY ANSWERS (1983); M. WALZER, JUST
AND UNJUST WARS (1977); JUSTICE AND WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE (P. Lawler, ed. 1983);
PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE (C. Reid ed., to be published 1986). Some important articles
include: Childress, Just-War Criteria, in WAR OR PEACE? THE SEARCH FOR NEW ANSWERS
40 (T. Shannon ed. 1980); Hehir, The Just War Ethic and Catholic Theology: Dynamics of
Change and Continuity, in WAR OR PEACE: THE SEARCH FOR NEW ANSWERS 15 (T. Shannon ed. 1980); Ramsey, A Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking, in STRATEGIC
THINKING AND ITS MORAL SIGNIFICANCE 101 (M. Kaplan ed. 1973); Reilly, In Proportion to
What? The Nature of the Conflict, in JUSTICE AND WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 5 (P. Lawler
ed. 1983); Grisez, The Moral Implications of a Nuclear Deterrent, 2 CENTER J. 9 (1982); Childress, Just-War Theories, 39 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 427 (1978). The following are still of
value: Ford, The Morality of Obliteration Bombing, 5 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 261 (1944);
Kunz, Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale: EditorialComment, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 528 (1951).
3.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE:

GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1983).
4. WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 5-6. This assessment of early Christian attitudes
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to warfare. During the fourth century, however, the Empire first began to
tolerate Christianity and finally recognized it as the legally preferred faith.
As a result of this reversal, Christians became responsible for affairs of state
and suddenly became aware of the need to reconcile faith with political realities. Augustine, Phillips notes, was the seminal figure in this reconciliation.
Even though Augustine was not the first Christian author to justify the use
of armed force under certain circumstances, his writings were later to form
the core of the Christian just war analysis.5
Subsequent Christian authors6 worked the earlier tradition into a usable
method of moral analysis. Phillips closes his introductory chapter with an
outline of the classic just war theory. It consists of two primary elements,
the jus ad bellum, the right to go to war, and the jus in bello, the legal and
ethical principles governing the proper conduct of war. The jus ad bellum
additionally consists of the following subcomponents: (1) War must be the
last resort, all peaceful means of resolving the dispute having been exhausted; (2) it must be "[d]eclared by legitimate authority;" and, (3) it must
be "[m]orally justifiable." According to Phillips, any of the following four
grounds satisfy the requirement of moral justification: (a) "[d]efense against
aggression;" (b) "[clorrection of an injustice that has gone uncorrected by
legitimate authority, 'in another place;'" (c) "[r]eestablishment of a social
seems to be correct. On the early Christian response to war, see L. SwIFT, THE EARLY FATHERS ON WAR AND MILITARY SERVICE (1983); Helgeland, Christiansand the Roman Army
from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine, II. 23,1 AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER ROEMISCHEN WELT 724 (1979); Christians and the Roman Army: A.D. 173-337, 43 CHURCH HisTORY 149 (1974); Swift, War and the Christian Conscience: The Early Years, II. 23,1
AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER ROEMISCHEN WELT 835 (1979); Grant, War-Just,Holy,
Unjust-in Hellenistic and Early Christian Thought, 20 AUGUSTINIANUM 173 (1980).

5. On Augustine, see: Hartigan, Saint Augustine on War and Killing: The Problem of
the Innocent, 27 J. HISTORY OF IDEAS 195 (1965). F. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE
MIDDLE AGES (1975) has a helpful discussion of the development of Augustine's ideas and

their utilization by medieval canonists and scholastics.
6. The growth of just war thought was a gradual process. Raymond of Penyafort (c.
1225), for example, isolated five elements to just war analysis: The fighting must be done by
laymen; a just cause must be present; the war must be unavoidable; those waging the war must
have the proper intent; and the war must be conducted under the proper authorities. See F.
RUSSELL, supra note 5; Russell, The HistoricalPerspective of the Bishops PastoralLetter The
View of One Medievalist,in PEACE INA NUCLEAR AGE (Reid ed. to be published 1986) [hereinafter cited as Russell, HistoricalPerspective]. Thomas Aquinas isolated three elements: legitimate authority must declare the war; there must be just cause; and the parties must possess a
proper intention. See F. RUSSELL, supra note 5; Russell, HistoricalPerspective, supra. On the
growth of the doctrine in the middle ages, see F. RUSSELL, supra note 5; Russell, Historical
Perspective, supra; Brundage, The Limits of the War-Making Power: The Contribution of the
Medieval Canonists,in PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE (Reid ed. to be published 1986). Just War
doctrine remained fluid for years. For post-medieval developments, see Elbe, The Evolution of
the Just War in InternationalLaw, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 665 (1939); Nussbaum, Just War-A
Legal Concept?, 42 MICH. L. REv. 453 (1943).
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order which will distribute7 justice;" and (d) "[u]ndertaken with the intention
of bringing about peace.",
Thejus in bello has two subcomponents: proportionality and discrimination. Phillips defines proportionality: "[t]he quantity of force employed or
threatened must always be morally proportionate to the end being sought in
war;" and he defines discrimination: "Force must never be applied in such a
objects
way as to make noncombatants and innocent persons the intentional
8
of attack. The only appropriate targets in war are combatants."
Phillips also recognizes "double effect," a basic principle of Catholic
moral reasoning. This principle undergirds the operation of thejus in bello
and permits the use of force, even where some evil effects can be foreseen, as
long as several conditions are satisfied: (1) "[t]he action must carry the intention to produce morally good consequences;" (2) "[t]he evil effects are not
intended as ends in themselves or as means to other ends, good or evil;" and,
(3) "[t]he permission of collateral evil must be justified by considerations of
proportionate moral weight." 9
Phillips opens the substantive portion of his volume with a chapter on the
jus ad bellum. His analysis of two of the components of thejus ad bellum,
the competent authority to declare war, and the requirement for moral justification of war, are worthy of note. The issue of the competent authority to
declare war is a crucial one today, especially in many parts of the developing
world, where insurgency movements seem endemic. The justness or unjustness of the Vietnam War, for example, in large measure turns on the question of who was the legitimate authority to conduct the war. Identification
of legitimate authority would similarly be a central part of any moral analysis of the insurgencies currently being waged by the contra freedom-fighters
in Nicaragua, the Afghan revolt against the Soviet imposed Babrak Karmal
government, or the Khmer Rouge and non-Communist resistance movements to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Phillips states that "[t]he
claim that war may be undertaken only by legitimate authority reflects a
political reality." 10 Unfortunately, Phillips eschews any discussion of methods for determining the legitimacy of competing claims because such an effort "ramifies into larger issues in political philosophy . . . ." Although
Phillips is probably correct in deciding that such an effort would take him
far afield, his decision not to engage in some examination of the issue is
7. WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Id. at 12-13.
9. Id. at 13.

10. Id. at 17.
11. Id.
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regretable because the just war doctrine is in need of such analysis.1 2
Commentators have pointed out that current international law regarding
the jus ad bellum is remarkably devoid of considerations of justice." In his
treatment of the requirement for moral justification before resorting to arms,
Phillips seeks to remedy this defect by taking issue with two tenets of international law. The first is the contemporary emphasis on the definition of
aggression as the first crossing of borders. 4 Phillips would allow the use of
preemptive strikes where a "state is morally certain that it is about to be
attacked."' 5 Phillips also disagrees with contemporary international practice when he asserts that under some circumstances a state may be obliged
"to intervene in the affairs of another state if there is an injustice there that
continues to be uncorrected by legitimate authority."' 6 Phillips recognizes
that contemporary international law has greatly circumscribed this traditional moral justification for war. He raises the not infrequently voiced criticism that current international law would have permitted the Nazi regime to
slaughter any number of Jews within the borders of Germany, as long as
7
that regime did not engage in aggression against other sovereign states.'
Phillips states:
It may seem perverse to accept any amount of localized evil
rather than intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state. After all, is
sovereignty all that important? I believe we have to say that states
ought not to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states for three
reasons: (1) such intrusions risk escalation to nuclear war, (2) they
impede the establishment of an international order, and (3) they
abrogate the obligation of peoples to sort out their own political
and social problems.
12. O'Brien has stated:

Logically, there should be an elaboratejus ad bellum andjus in bello for revolutionary war, but development of such a doctrine has never been seriously attempted. As
a result, the issues of revolutionary war tend to be treated on an ad hoc basis as
special cases vaguely related to the regular categories of just war.
See THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR, supra note 2, at 18.
13. This argument is made by J. T. Johnson. See Johnson, Toward Reconstructingthe Jus
Ad Bellum THE MONIST 461 (1973); Johnson, Ideology and the Jus Ad Bellum: Justice in the
Initiation of War, 41 J. AMER. ACADEMY OF RELIGION 212 (June, 1973); see also H. MEYROwITz, LE PRINCIPE DE L'EGALITE DES BELLIGERENTS DEVANT LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE

(1970).
14. Article 2 of the U.N. Consensus Definition of Aggression provides that the "first use
of armed force" establishes "prima facie evidence of an act of aggression." G.A. Res. 3314,
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
15. WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 19.
16. Id. at 20.
17. See THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR, supra note 2, at 22-23, for criticism
of this sort; see also Lillich, Forcible Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL L.J.

205 (1969) (international law permits humanitarian intervention).
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We ought to be prepared, however, to override this rule where a
state fails to guarantee those minimal rights which justify its existence. For if it consistently fails to protect the "life, liberty, and
property," of its inhabitants, one might very well argue that the
sovereignty is dissolved anyway and that therefore there is no intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state.' 8
While this effort to revive a long dormant component of thejus ad bellum
deserves applause, its implementation presents some practical difficulties.
The jus ad bellum has evolved the way it has in part because of the lack of
consensus as to what constitutes "fail[ure] to protect the 'life, liberty, and
property' of its inhabitants."' 9 The adoption of a principle permitting intervention into the affairs of another state as a tenet of international law ought,
in order to be effective, to presuppose international agreement on a set of
values the violation of which could be deemed sufficiently grave to justify
armed intervention. Such an agreement may be difficult to come by in the
present international order. Failing such agreement, a principle of intervention could be subjected to abuse and even to charges of "western moral imperialism." It seems, however, that Phillips is saying that it may be morally
incumbent on states to intervene to prevent certain actions by another sovereign state, whatever the consequences at international law. In extreme circumstances intervention may well be the just action and not to intervene
could itself be unjust.
In his next chapter, Phillips discusses the jus in bello. This chapter is
largely an analysis of the principle of discrimination. Phillips takes as a
premise the belief that, if any action is to be considered immoral, it is a
violent attack upon another person with the intent to kill or do grave bodily
harm. Thus, one can only kill morally in wartime if one's intent is not murderous; that is, one must be intending something other than a violent attack
upon a person qua person.
This seems at first glance to be an exercise in logic chopping. Phillips
avoids this charge through the use of the principle of double effect. Double
effect, as pointed out above, permits one to engage in certain acts that have
evil collateral effects where one's intention is to achieve good consequences,
and where one does not intend the evil effects either in themselves or as
means to other ends. The soldier in the double effect model does not intend
to kill the enemy. His intent rather is to disable the "combatant in the
man,"' 20 and not to kill the man himself. This intent may, and usually does,
result in the enemy's death, but the killing of the enemy is not willed as such.
18. WAR AND
19. Id.
20. Id. at 33.

JUSTICE,

supra note 1, at 21 (emphasis in original).
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The distinction may be explained as one between doing X intending Y as the
result and doing X knowing that Y will result.2 1
The logic of this argument may appear strained to the uninitiated. Phillips anticipates criticism and counters with an example that demonstrates
the applicability of double effect to moral issues in warfare. Jones and Smith
both go to war, Jones intending only to restrain the enemy, Smith intending
to kill as many opponents as he can. Each kills one enemy. The difference
in approach is not apparent at this level but becomes so once one raises the
issue of prisoners of war. Jones, whose intent is only to disable the combatant, is logically obliged to take prisoners. Smith, whose intent is to kill as
many enemies as he can, lacks this obligation. Similarly, Jones is restricted
to killing combatants. Smith would not be so obliged. Smith could logically
engage in total war, since he could consider the enemy's entire populace,
instead of only the combatants within it, as subject to attack.
The principles of discrimination and double effect are essential to the
moral conduct of limited war. Ignorance of these principles has led to much
of the tragedy of modern war, whether it be the incendiary bombing of Dresden, the systematic abuse of prisoners of war by communist forces in the
Korean and Vietnamese wars, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or terrorist attacks on civilian populations in the Middle East and elsewhere. Phillips makes a strong appeal to return to the principles of
discrimination and double effect, an appeal that should be followed in theory
as well as in practice.
The issue of proportionality receives only abbreviated treatment. Phillips
expands on his earlier definition of proportionality:
The principle of proportionality holds that in cases where the use
of force is justified it cannot be employed in absolutely any measure. Obviously, if the aim of war is the correction of injustice,
then the level of force must not be such as to create new and
greater injustices. This principle is sometimes confused with the
doctrine of 'minimal force,' which holds that the least amount of
force consistent with effecting the desired ends ought to be our
goal. While minimal force should always be used, we also have to
consider the degree of violence, for some military tasks might very
well require a minimum of force which would be disproportionate.
That is, our calculations must include not only a forecast of necessary minimal means but also of consequences.
This distinction is of crucial importance because it directs our
attention to the means of waging war and thus to the moral questions provoked by certain types of weaponry. In effect, proportion21. Id. at 34.
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ality is not to be calculated relative to a weapons system taken as a
'given' but, rather, in terms of a calculus which will include the
weapons themselves. So, for example, it may not be morally acceptable to say the following sort of thing: Given the fact of nuclear weapons deployed for massive retaliation, what casualty level
is acceptable within the possibilities of these devices? Now this is
precisely what some military thinkers have attempted to do...
but my contention here is that this move renders the whole conception of proportionality vacuous by making its significance dependent upon whatever weapons happen to exist at a given time.2 2
It is instructive to point out that certain weapons systems might be objectively disproportionate. However, Phillips' argument could benefit from further refinement. Although this reviewer agrees that some weapons, such as
bacteriological weaponry and much of the nuclear weaponry designed for
use within the context of mutual assured destruction doctrine (M.A.D.),
should be classified as objectively disproportionate, he disagrees with any
effort to group all nuclear weapons under the label of "objectively disproportionate." Some tactical battlefield uses of nuclear weapons could well be
proportionate in the appropriate circumstances, such as when national survival is at stake. The application of proportionality also requires knowledge
of the values for which one is willing to fight. Phillips omits consideration of
this point. It seems self-evident, however, that the survival of a nation or a
way of life could permit the use of a weapons system that lesser objectives
might not permit.23 Thus, for example, Britain could not have justified
under any circumstances the use of nuclear weapons in the Falklands conflict; but Britain could conceivably justify the use of tactical nuclear weapons
to repel an invasion of the British Isles. This caveat should not, however,
detract from the thrust of Phillips' argument: Some weapons systems possess such a destructive capacity that their use could never be justified.
Following his discussion ofjus in bello, Phillips turns his attention to two
twentieth century problems, nuclear war and guerrilla insurgency. His
chapter on nuclear arms is preoccupied almost entirely with strategic deterrence. Equating strategic deterrence to M.A.D., Phillips finds that nuclear
war would be both indiscriminate and disproportionate. Phillips condemns
any use of nuclear weapons, since, he argues, nuclear weapons represent a
difference not in degree, but in kind, to conventional weapons. This is true,
he asserts, of all nuclear weapons, from tactical weapons for use on the battlefield to strategic missles with MIRV's (multiple independently targeted
22. Id. at 28-29 (emphasis in original).
23. This is the approach of W. O'Brien. See
supra note 2, at 19-21.

THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR,
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reentry vehicles). He also determines that "[t]o threaten to use nuclear
weapons is necessarily to threaten the unjustified killing of innocent people
and thereby to violate on a titanic scale the absolute right of life." 24 Nonetheless, Phillips does not advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament since
present deterrence policies represent a "balance." Phillips analogizes nuclear weaponry to a deadly bacillus to which deterrence is only a partially
effective vaccine, not a cure. Phillips recommends arms control, but finds
that it has had little historical success. In a "throwaway" paragraph at the
close of his analysis, Phillips claims that, even though present strategic arsenels may be maintained for the sake of balance, their use as a deterrent to a
conventional attack on western Europe is "wholly disproportionate to the
goal." 2 5
Phillips' analysis of the ethics of nuclear weaponry requires some clarification. First, Phillips would lump various nuclear strategies, including massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction, flexible response, and various
strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry, into an indistinguishable whole. He
then criticizes this nuclear capability as being different in kind from conventional weapons and inherently indiscriminate and disproportionate. This approach is fundamentally ahistorical. Current American strategic targeting
plans are substantially different from those of a decade or two or three ago.
During the 1970's U.S. targeting doctrine shifted from being primarily
countervalue (directed against population centers) to counterforce (directed
against military targets).2 6 Current targeting plans might still be criticized
for being excessively preoccupied with the destruction of "economic assets"
(which translates into the destruction of some population centers), 27 but one
must recognize that targeting philosophy has undergone some fairly dramatic shifts, as have nuclear weapons themselves. Recent history, moreover,
does not support Phillips' claim that nuclear weapons have not become more
discriminate or proportionate. In fact, current nuclear weapons systems are
considerably more sophisticated than those of earlier generations. Guidance
systems have improved, making weapon delivery more precise. This improvement in guidance systems has also allowed the megatonnage of each
warhead to be reduced. Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons now exist
which could be used on a battlefield without endangering population centers.
None of this is to say that devastation from a nuclear war, even if limited to
battlefield exchanges of tactical nuclear weapons, would not be enormous. It
24. WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 83.
25. Id. at 85.
26. See D. BALL, TARGETING FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE (Adelphi Paper No. 185,

1983).
27. Id. at 25-34.
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is cited, however, to demonstrate that since the technical questions are more
complicated than Phillips makes them out to be, the moral issues implicated
may be similarly complex.
Phillips also maintains a significant silence on the matter of defensive
weapons systems, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (popularly
known as "Star Wars"), which may or may not be a workable concept.28 At
present, SDI is only in the planning stages and in as much need of scrutiny
from moralists as from scientists and diplomats. Abstractly speaking, it
seems more moral to construct a system that would allow a nation to move
away from a deterrent that threatens wholesale destruction. But construction of a defensive system may threaten the balance that Phillips sees as
essential to retaining the morality of the present system of deterrence. A
serious shortcoming of the volume is Phillips' failure to consider whether a
continued nuclear "balance," accompanied by arms control negotiations, is a
preferable moral course to efforts to change the "character" of deterrence to
a defensive posture.
Finally, the issue of abandoning the nuclear defense of western Europe
should not be reduced to a single insignificant paragraph. Presently there is
no balance of conventional forces in Europe.29 The defense of western Europe is largely dependent on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. A shift from a nuclear to a conventional defense in Europe would likely entail both the
reestablishment of a draft30 and increased defense budgets for both the
United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) allies. 3 ' A conventional rather than nuclear defense of Europe would be a
more moral stance but it is clear that such an option would not be pain free.
28. The Strategic Defense Initiative has already generated a great deal of literature. Some
helpful books and articles include: OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES (1985); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, COUNTERMEASURES, AND ARMS CONTROL (1985); R. JASTROW, HOW TO

MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBSOLETE (1985); Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, The
President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control, 63 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 264 (1984); Burrows,
Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security, 62 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 843 (1984); Jastrow,
Reagan vs. the Scientists: Why the Presidentis Right about Missile Defense, 77 COMMENTARY
23 (Jan. 1984); Payne & Gray, Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition, 62 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 820 (1984); Keyworth, Ganging Up on Star Wars, Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1984, at A15,

col. 3; Rensberger, "Star Wars" Splits Experts Into Two Camps, Wash. Post, Mar. 3, 1985, at
Al, col. 4.
29. See Luttwak, How to Think About Nuclear War, 74 COMMENTARY 21-25 (Aug.
1982), for a summary of the relative conventional fighting capabilities of N.A.T.O. and Warsaw Pact forces.
30. On potential shortfalls of troops in a European conflict, see N.A.T.O. Commander
General Bernard Rogers' statements in Wilson, General Urges Reviving Draft, Wash. Post,

Mar. 2, 1985, at A7, col. 4.
31. See Without the Bomb, THE ECONOMIST, July 31, 1982, at 11-12.
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Guerrilla insurgencies have been depicted as the antithesis of nuclear deterrence. While the nature of deterrence demands state-of-the-art sophistication in such matters as computers, guidance and tracking systems, and
launch vehicles, guerrilla war is often viewed as unstructured and essentially
primitive. The popular imagination sees small bands striking out in a haphazard fashion from remote jungle or desert bases.
Guerrilla insurgency movements, however, generally possess certain common features. Phillips summarizes Mao Zedong, who identified three phases
as common to guerrilla conflict:
According to Mao, guerrilla war develops in three stages. In the
first stage, the insurgent forces, which are likely to be small in
number, engage in hit-and-run encounters with regular
forces. .

.

.

These opening guns pave the way for the second

stage, which consists of building a political infrastructure which
will parallel that of the government in power. This creates a country within a country and is a necessary move toward the third
stage, which sees the insurgents emerging openly in order to do
battle with the army
of the government in a more or less conven32
tional manner.

Phillips makes several points worth bearing in mind. The first is that
there is no necessary relationship between guerrilla warfare and terrorism.
Terrorism can never be justified. This is so for both moral and prudential
reasons. Terrorism is immoral because it erases the distinction between
combatant and noncombatant. Phillips illustrates this with a quote from
George Habbash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine:
"In the age of the revolution of the peoples oppressed by the world imperialist system there can be no geographical or political boundaries or moral limits to the operations of the people's camp. In today's world, no one is
'innocent,' and no one is a 'neutral.' ,33 Such a proposition voids any application of discrimination; no protected group of noncombatants exempt from
attack would exist in the Habbash view.
Not only is it immoral, it is also imprudent to engage in terror tactics.
The use of terrorism as a "short cut" to power is frequently the opening of a
Pandora's box. Subsequent groups seeking to gain power often attempt to
justify their resort to terror by reference to the record of the party in power.
As an example of this phenomenon, Phillips cites the frequency with which
Arab militant groups justify their use of terror "by pointing to Prime Minis' '3 4
ter Begin's participation in the massacre at Dir Yasin.
32. WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 90.
33. Id. at 86-87 (quoting Habbash, TIME MAGAZINE, April 1970, at 32).
34. Id. at 88.

1184

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 34:1173

Phillips also focuses on the conduct of counterinsurgency. It is to the
counterinsurgent's advantage to defeat the insurgency while it is still in
Mao's first stage, before the guerillas have had a chance to establish an alternative political structure. Phillips sees the resort to conventional military
tactics by the counterinsurgent as a weakness. It often leads to indiscriminate and disproportionate responses, thus threatening the morality of the
counterinsurgent's efforts.
Phillips alternatively proposes that counterinsurgency be conducted on
the analogy of a "constabulary action," and that guerrillas, at least in the
first stage of operations, be considered as analogous to criminals. Phillips
recommends that an elite force be deployed to act essentially as police officers, in an effort to prevent the insurgency from spreading. This force,
Phillips suggests, would rely on greatly enhanced intelligence gathering to
perform effectively. 5
Phillips' proposal is a creative and quite possibly workable one. It raises
several questions of interest: How should such a force operate? Should infiltration of guerrilla cells be permitted? Should torture of captured guerrillas
be allowed? Would criminal justice systems need to be modified to accommodate this new class of criminal? These issues would need to be addressed
before any counterinsurgent could practically utilize Phillips' analogy.
Phillips also criticizes a frequently employed and always immoral guer35. The 1977 Geneva Protocol II (formally known as the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144), designed specifically to deal with internal
conflicts offers some guidance to insurgents and counter-insurgents alike as to when an insurgent movement should be considered as war and not as criminal activity. Article I holds that
the Protocol covers:
[A]ll armed conflicts ... which take place in the territory of a High Contracting
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military activites
Not covered by the Protocol are: "[S]ituations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature." Article 1(2).
It would appear that the treaty allows counterinsurgents to consider guerrilla movements in
Mao's first stage to be subject to domestic criminal law. Successful creation of a political
infrastructure, however, would seem to bring the guerrillas within the terms of Protocol II.
A federal district court has recently had the opportunity to consider whether insurgents
should be treated as criminals or "political" prisoners. The question in In re Requested Extradition of Doherty by the Gov't. of the U.K. & N. Ir., 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), was
whether Doherty, a member of the Irish Republican Army convicted of murder for the death
of a British soldier, could be extradited by the United Kingdom or whether he fit the "political
offense" exception of the extradition treaty. The court rejected the extradition request, finding
Doherty to be a political offender. The case illustrates the complexity involved in treating
insurgents as subject to criminal laws.
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rilla tactic. Guerrillas often operate within the populace at large, frequently
intending to use population centers as a shield, thereby making counterinsurgency efforts prohibitively costly in terms of innocent life, or, where the
counterinsurgent government attacks, embarassing it internationally for having taken the lives of noncombatants. Guerrilla strategy of this sort is immoral, Phillips asserts, because it fails to respect noncombatant immunity.
Such a situation can be remedied only where combat can be limited to a
specified class of individuals, clearly designated as combatants.
Finally, an omission in Phillip's analysis should be noted. His section on
guerrilla war is written with an American (or at least a western) audience in
mind and it rests on the premise that western governments will inevitably be
aligning with counterinsurgent governments against guerrilla movements
primarily of a Marxist nature. He does not consider the moral issues involved in providing support to insurgency movements. This is a not uncommon failing among writers on moral issues. Writing on guerrilla war,
William O'Brien could state in 1981 that "I do not foresee the likelihood of
U.S. intervention on the side of revolutionaries." 36 Yet the United States
has done precisely that in the last several years. "Covert" aid to the rebels in
Afghanistan is well-documented. Similarly, the provision of aid to the contra freedom fighters in Nicaragua has been an issue before the last two Congresses. Aid is also being supplied to the non-Communist resistance in
Cambodia. Finally, the House of Representatives has recently voted to repeal the Clark Amendment, which had prohibited assistance to non-Communist forces in Angola. The failure to include moral issues in debates
considering the backing of insurgent movements is not unique to Phillips. It
appears that while moralists have become accustomed to thinking of western
states solely as being on the "defensive" against an onslaught of guerrilla
insurgencies, the developments of the last several years seem to demand a
shift in perspective.
Phillips next examines the two standard alternatives invoked by those who
reject the just war approach, pacifism and realpolitik. Phillips makes a telling case against pacifism, finding that a fundamental flaw in the pacifist outlook is the inability to draw distinctions among various forms of aggression.
The pacifist is unable to accept differences based on the intent of the parties:
"The pacifist can see no difference between wars which are fought in selfdefense and wars of brutal and blatant conquest." 37
On the other hand, Phillips does not advocate that an individual acquiesce
in every foreign adventure in which his state chooses to become involved.
36.
37.

THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR,
WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 1,at 109.

supra note 2, at 159.
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The just war doctrine provides a means of moral analysis by which both
states and individuals may measure the morality of a given conflict. 3' This
leads necessarily to selective conscientious objection.
Selective conscientious objection is specifically disallowed under present
selective service law.39 Yet an individual is not absolved from wrong-doing
by the claim that he was merely following orders.' An order to report for
induction at a time of unjust war could very easily be an order requiring an
individual to participate in immorality that he is duty-bound to resist. Those
who take seriously the tenets of the just war theory should lobby to change
this feature of selective service law. While the odds of success are not great,
it is possible that some form of alternative service could be rendered by selective conscientious objectors.4 1
According to Phillips, realpolitik shares the same central weakness as pacifism: it is unable to distinguish between just and unjust exertions of armed
force. The practitioner of realpolitik may initiate war blithely, since he lacks
the restraints that thejus ad bellum places on the adherent of just war. Similarly, war, once engaged, can escalate easily to total war since the realpolitik
model lacks the restraints of thejus in bello. The just war doctrine can thus
be seen as offering a middle ground between pacifism and realpolitik; it provides the criteria to distinguish between just and unjust encounters, and,
once begun, to restrain war from escalating beyond the causes of justice that
might be served.
Perhaps Phillips' most important contribution to just war thinking is to
reiterate the fact that war, to be just, must be limited. In his closing remarks
on the "future of war," Phillips refers to Clausewitz, the nineteenth century
German theoretician of warfare. Clausewitz hypothesized an absolute form
of war, "an instantaneous blow without duration," and contrasted it with
38. See Genovesi, The Just War Doctrine: A Warrantfor Resistance, 45 THE THOMIST
503 (1981).
39. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (presenting the issue of selective
conscientious objection). Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), a companion case to Gillette,
presented squarely the case of a Catholic objecting to service in the Vietnam War on just war
grounds.
40. For a thumbnail sketch of the role of individual responsibility in war time from the
middle ages through the Nuremburg Trials and the My Lai Massacre, see Marcin, Individual
Conscience Under Military Compulsion, 57 A.B.A. J. 1222 (1971).
41. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1982) currently exempts those "who, by reason of religious
training and belief, [are] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form," and
permits alternative service to be substituted. See also 32 C.F.R. §§ 1656.1-.20 (1984) for regulations implementing this statute. Phillips is not sanguine about the possibility of a government ever authorizing selective conscientious objector status. Yet there would seem logically
to be no obstacle to applying the alternative service provision to selective conscientious objectors as well as to those opposed to war in any form.
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war as conducted in the nineteenth century, a war slowed by the many "frictions" that accompanied it.4 2 Countervalue nuclear war would close the gap
that Clausewitz imagined would always exist between war as an absolute and
war as actually conducted. A total strategic nuclear war could render extinct most or all life on the planet. Just war thinking is an essential check to
both the planning of war and its conduct in a world in which statecraft can
no longer be conducted without limit. War engaged in for light or trivial
reasons is not war; it is the murderous taking of life; so also is war fought
without discrimination or proportionality. Phillips' essential argument is a
sound one, despite this reviewer's cavils with some of its individual components. The just war theory, of ancient and noble lineage, is still a valid
means of moral analysis and restraint in war.

42. WAR AND

JUSTICE,

supra note 1, at 131-39.

